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351 
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment has been held inapplicable 
where the authorities enter upon private property and search an area beyond 
the "curtilage" of a home. The United States Supreme Comt has concluded 
that there is no reasonable expectation of p1ivacy in "open fields". In arriv-
ing at this conclusion, America's highest court reasoned that it is not un-
common for members of the public to venture onto private prope1ty despite 
the presence of fences or "no trespassing" signs. This possibility, according 
to the Court, renders any expectation of privacy in such areas objectively 
unreasonable. As a result, the Fomth Amendment has no application to 
searches which target private property beyond the immediate perimeter of a 
home.I 
In R. v. Lauda, reported ante at p. 320, the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
refused to incorporate the American "open fields" doctrine into s. 8 of the 
Charter. This holding is directly at odds with R. v. Patriquen2. In Patri-
quen, a majority of the Nova Scotia Comt of Appeal endorsed the "open 
fields" doctrine in concluding that entry onto a privately owned woodland, 
in the absence of a warrant, did not violate s. 8 of the Charter. 
These conflicting provincial appeal court decisions suggest that it will not 
be Jong before the "open fields" doctrine finds its way before the Supreme 
Court of Canada. In deciding whether to endorse the "open fields" doctrine 
in Canada, the Supreme Court should remember the theoretical divide that 
distinguishes its jurisprudence under s. 8 of the Charter from the decisions 
of its American counterpart under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Bill of Rights . This article argues that the "open fields" doctrine 
'"or the Ontario Bar. 
l See Hester v. United Stmes ( 1924), 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (U.S. S.C.); 
Oliver v. United States (1984), 466 U.S. 170. 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed. 2d 214 (U.S. Ky.). 
2(1994), 36 C.R. (4th) 363, 136 N.S.R. (2d) 218, 388 A.P.R. 2 I 8, 27 C.R.R. (2d) 135 (N.S. 
C.A.). The status of the "open fields" doctrine went unresolved when the Supreme Court 
dismissed a further appeal based on s. 24(2) of the Charter alone, see 43 C.R. (4th) 134. 188 
N.R. 232, 146 N.S.R. (2d) 74, 422 A.P.R. 74, [ 1995] 4 S.C.R. 42 (S.C.C.). 
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should not be adopted in Canada as it is premised upon the perilous Ameri-
can "risk analysis" which the Supreme Court has previously rejected. 
The Rejection of the American "Risk Analysis" in Canada 
In 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada was afforded its first opportunity to 
pass upon the meaning to be given to s. 8 of the Charter. In Hunter v. 
Southam, in deciding upon the purpose of s. 8, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada looked to the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court 
under the Fourth Amendment, Katz v. United States. In Hunter the Supreme 
Court held that, like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of s . 8 was to 
protect people and not places. Towards this end the Corn1 recognized thats. 
8 of the Charter protects an individual's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."3 In time, the Supreme Court indicated that this is the starting point 
for Charter scmtiny under s. 8. A court confronted with a privacy claim 
must 
... inquire into the purposes or s. 8 in determining whether or not a particular 
form or police conduct constitutes a "search" for constitutional purposes .... 
Clearly, it is only where a person's reasonable expectations of privacy an; some-
how dimini shed by an investigatory technique that s. 8 of the Charter comes 
into play. As a result, not every form or examination conducted by the govern-
ment will constitute a "search" for constitutional purposes. On the contrary. only 
where those state examinations constitute an intrusion upon some reasonable 
privacy interest of individuals does the fovernment action in question constitute 
a "search" within the meaning of s. 8. 
The similarity between American and Canadian jurispmdence, under the re-
spective constitutional guarantees, ends with a recognition that the protec-
tion of reasonable expectations of privacy is the purpose underlying both 
constitutional safeguards. Although the Suprerne Court of Canada shares 
the view of the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment 
3canada (Director <d. !nl'e.wigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch! \'. 
Sou1/w111 Inc., 33 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193. 27 B.L.R. 297. 41 C.R. (3d) 97, 84 D.T.C. 6467, (sub 
nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, I .I D.L.R. (4th) 641, 
55 N.R. 241. 55 A.R. 291. 2 C.P.R. (3d) I. 9 C.R.R. 355. (sub nom. Director of Investiga-
tions & Research Combines lnvestig(lfio11 Branch v. Southam Inc.) [ 1984] 6 W.W.R. 577 
(S.C.C.) at 108 (C.C.C.). After citing Stewart J.'s view that this was the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, see Kat-:, v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347. 19 L.Ed. 2cl 576, 88 S. 
Ct. 507 (U.S. Cal.) at 351 (U.S.): Dickson J. indicated "I believe this approach equally ap-
propriate in construing the protections in s. 8.". 
4R. v. £vans.104C.C.C.(3d)23.45C.R.(4th)210. 191 N.R.327.131 D.L.R. (4th)654.33 
C.R.R. (2d) 248, 69 B.C.A.C. 81, 113 W.A.C. 81. [ 1996] I S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) at 29 (C.C.C.). 
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that privacy is the pivotal concern underlying s. 8 of the Charter, the Com1 
has usually taken a much broader view of what constitutes an intmsion 
upon constitutionally protected privacy interests.5 
Ever since the Warren Court delivered the Katz decision, shifting the focus 
of Fourth Amendment jurispmdence from property law concepts to privacy 
issues, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have systematically narrowed the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection by taking an increasingly narrow 
view of privacy expectations.6 The Supreme Court of Canada has rejected 
this narrow approach because it seems "largely motivated by the social 
costs attendant upon the application of the strict exclusionary rule in the 
United States."7 There are no parallel concerns in Canada given the balanc-
ing approach to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.8 
In Katz9 the United States Supreme Court had held that a reasonable excep-
tion exists if two requirements are met, first that a person exhibited an ac-
tual or subjective expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
5see R. Harvie & H. Foster, "Different Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court Of 
Canada. American Jurisprudence And The Continuing Revision Of Criminal Law Under The 
Charter" ( 1992), 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 39 at I 0 I. 
6see B.J. Serr, "Great Expectations Of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection" ( 1989), 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583; L.A. Berner, "'The Supreme Court and the Fall of the 
Fourth Amendment" (1991), 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 383 (1991): W.S. McCanish, ''Unreasonable 
Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment" ( 1991 ), 20 Stetson L. Rev. 
435. 
1R. v. Edwards, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136. 45 C.R. (4th) 307, 192 N.R. 81. 26 O.R. (3d) 736 
(note). 132 D.L.R. (4th) 31. 33 C.R.R. (2d) 226, 88 0.A.C. 321, [ 1996) I S.C.R. 128 
(S.C.C.) at 159 (C.C.C.), Laforest J .. concurring in the result. Also see R. v. Silveira, 97 
C.C.C. (3d) 450, 38 C.R. (4th) 330, 23 O.R. (3d) 256 (note), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 181 N.R. 
161, 28 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 81 0.A.C. 161, [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.) at 467-68 (C.C.C.). 
LaForest J., dissenting. For a discussion of the deleterious impact of the automatic exclusion-
ary rule on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see J. Dawe, "Standing to Challenge Searches 
and Seizures Under the Charter: The Lesson of the American Experience and Their Applica-
tion to Canadian Law" ( 1993), 52 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 39 at 49-55. 
8The factors relevant to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter are fully 
discussed in R. v. Collins. 33 C.C.C. (3d) I, [ 1987] 3 W.W.R. 699, [ 1987) I S.C.R. 265, (sub 
nom. Collins v. R.) 38 D.L.R. (4th) 508, 74 N.R. 276, 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) I, 56 C.R. (3d) 193, 
28 C.R.R. 122 (S .C.C.) and R. v. Stillman , 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 , 144 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 5 C.R. 
(5th) I. (1997) I S.C.R. 607, 209 N.R. 81. 185 N.B.R. (2d) I. 472 A.P.R. ·I, 42 C.R.R. (2d) 
189 (S.C.C.). 
9supra, note 3. 
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be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. IO Despite this 
relatively clear exposition, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts instead focused 
on the words of Stewa11 J. who explained the privacy focus of the Fourth 
Amendment by indicating that "what a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." 11 These words have been seized upon to conclude that 
whenever an individual assumes a risk of exposing otherwise private con-
duct to the public, the Fomth Amendment's protections will not apply. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has categorically rejected the "risk analysis" 
which taints recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.12 According to the 
Court, these American decisions improperly focus upon the risk that those 
guilty of wrongdoing have assumed, without considering the larger societal 
concerns at work. The ultimate question is not whether criminals should 
bear the risk, but whether that risk should be imposed on all members of 
Canadian society .13 The question must always be framed in broad and neu-
tral terms otherwise "all of us must bear the risk of such surveillance".14 In 
deciding if a particular governmental intrusion should be tolerated by the 
citizenry under s. 8 of the Charter, courts must consider whether the "par-
ticular form of unauthorized surveillance in question would see the amount 
of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens diminished to a compass in-
consistent with the aims of a free and open society."15 
In Canada, the normative approach employed in defining reasonable expec-
tations of privacy has insured greater constitutional scrutiny of state investi-
1 ()Ibid. Harlan J., concurring. The Supreme Court of Canada recently seized upon this aspect 
of the Katz holding in articulating the requirements that must be met before an individual can 
have standing to assen a territorial or spatial claim of privacy in relation to a particular place, 
see R. v. Edwards. supra. note 7 at 150-151 (C.C.C.). Also see R. F. Belnavis, 118 C.C.C. 
(3d) 405. 29 M.V.R. (3d) I. 216 N.R. 161, 34 O.R. (3d) 806 (headnote only), 151 D.L.R. 
(4th) 443, I 03 0.A.C. 81. I 0 C.R. (5th l 65, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, 46 C.R.R. (2d) 272 
(S.C.C.). 
I I Katz, ibid. at 351. per Stewart J. 
l 2see R. 1'. Sane/Ii, I 03 N.R. 86, 37 0.A.C. 322. 74 C.R. (3d) 281. (sub nom. R. 1'. Duarte) 
53 C.C.C. (3d) I. [ 19901 I S.C.R. 30. 65 D.L.R. (4th) 240, 45 C.R.R. 278. 71 O.R. (2d) 575 
(S.C.C.) at 13-14 (C.C.C.l: R. v. Wong. 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460. I C.R. (4th) I. 120 N.R. 34, 
[ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 2 C.R.R. (2d) 277, 45 0.A.C. 250 (S.C.C.) at 477-78, 482 (C.C.Cl: R. i'. 
Wise. 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193. 11 C.R. (4th) 253, 8 C.R.R. (2d) 53. 51 0.A.C. 351. 135 N.R. 161. 
[ l 992J I S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) at 206-207 (C.C.C.), LaForest L di~senting in the rL~sult. 
13 Duarte, ibid, at 17. 
14wong. supra note 12, at 481. 
15/bid. at 478. 
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gative techniques. A number of examples quickly serve to illustrate this im-
portant point. 
In the United States, a government agent is free to surreptitiously record a 
conversation with an individual. The Fourth Amendment does not apply be-
cause everyone assumes the risk that a conversation could be repeated accu-
rately in court, whether through memory or mechanical recording.16 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, however, has distinguished between the risk 
posed by speaking to a tattle-tale and the prospect that government agents 
may be listening to and recording our conversations every time we speak. 
"They involve different risks to the individual and the body politic. In other 
words, the law recognizes that we inherently have to bear the risk of the 
'tattle-tale' but draws the line at concluding that we must also bear, as the 
price of choosing to speak to another human being, the risk of a having a 
permanent recording made of our words."17 
The same reasoning has been applied to video surveillance. In Canada, an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not spent the moment they 
invite an individual into a private place like a hotel room. According to the 
Supreme Court, 
... there is an important difference between the risk that our activities may be 
observed by other persons, and the risk that agents of the state, in the absence of 
prior authorization, will permanently record those activities on video tape ... To 
fail to recognize the distinction is to blind oneself to the fact that the threat to 
privacy inherent in subjecting ourselves to the ordinary observations of others 
pales by comparison with the threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to 
make permanent electronic records of our words or activities. 18 
In contrast, such measures would appear acceptable in the United States 
under the "risk analysis''. If one assumes the risk by exposing a private 
place to public view then reasonable expectations of privacy are lost, gov-
ernment deception is irrelevant to the constitutional equation. 19 
l6see United States v. White (1970), 401 U.S. 745; On Lee v. United States (1952), 343 U.S. 
747 (which had focused on the absence of a physical intrusion into a private place, empha-
sizing old trespass approach to privacy). 
17 Duarte. supra note 12, at 14. The court preferred the approach of American state courts, 
interpreting privacy guarantees under their state constitutions, over the approach of the 
United States Supreme Court in White, ibid. 
18wong. supra note 12, at 478. 
19see H{!ffa v. United States ( 1966), 385 U.S. 293 (use of secret informers, acting at the 
behest of government, docs not intrude on reasonable privacy expectations): Lewis v. United 
States ( 1966), 385 U.S. 206 (it is permissible for government agents to misrepresent their 
identity or purpose in order to obtain access to private places). 
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In the United States, police are free to affix an electronic transmitting de-
vice to a vehicle in order to monitor an individual's whereabouts. The 
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, as the police could theoretically moni-
tor the vehicle without such a device, therefore no reasonable expectation of 
privacy is encroached upon.20 But when confronted with the same issue, the 
Supreme Court of Canada again rejected the all-or-nothing approach to pri-
vacy expectations that plagues Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Court conceded that police could theoretically monitor a citizen's move-
ments while in their vehicle through ordinary surveillance and the use of 
sensory enhancing devices like binoculars. But the Supreme Court of Can-
ada recognized a profound difference between "the threat to privacy inher-
ent in courting the ordinary observations of other members of society ... 
[and] ... the threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to electronically 
monitor our every movement."21 State activity in the latter category in-
trudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and is subject to scrutiny 
under s. 8 of the Charter. 
This brief comparison with American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
reveals just how expansive an approach the Supreme Court of Canada has 
taken in defining Canadians' reasonable privacy expectations. In the United 
States, the "risk analysis" approach has been favoured when deciding 
whether an investigative technique intrudes upon a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interest. In Canada, in contrast, the Supreme Court has en-
dorsed a more normative approach in deciding whether a particular measure 
intrudes upon a legitimate privacy expectation. The Comt has been careful 
not to automatically import American jurisprudence, developed in a differ-
ent constitutional context, into its analysis under s. 8 of the Charter. This 
difference in approaches must always be remembered when Canadian 
courts are asked to adopt developments under the Fourth Amendment, like 
the "open fields" doctrine. 
The American "Open Fields" Doctrine 
The "open fields" exception to the Fourth Amendment is undoubtedly bot.: 
tomed on the "risk analysis". It is premised on an assumption that those 
who own or occupy private property assume the risk of a passer-by wander-
ing onto their open field and discovering their criminal conduct. That risk is 
then equated with a law enforcement official entering onto private property 
20united States v. Knolls ( 1983), 460 U.S. 276 (U.S. Minn.). 
21 Wise, supra note 12, at 207. 
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in search of criminal evidence. This analysis ignores that the risk involved 
in each form of intrusion is considerably different. In the words of Justice 
Laforest, each possibility involves "different risks to the individual and the 
body politic".22 
No doubt Canadians accept the possibility that members of the public may 
periodically walk across their property uninvited; the example of a neigh-
bour's child retiieving a baseball that has gone astray immediately comes to 
mind. That possibility is considerably different, however, from the prospect 
of law enforcement officials entering onto private property to collect evi-
dence implicating an occupant in a crime. In this latter situation, Canadians 
would undoubtedly expect that the police would first obtain a search war-
rant. This type of distinction is not foreign to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In R. v. Evans23, the police had received an anonymous tip that the occu-
pant of a home was growing marijuana inside. They were unable to corrob-
orate the tip based on a check of criminal records, electricity consumption 
and a visual peiimeter search. Eventually the police entered onto the prop-
erty and approached the front door. When the appellant opened the front 
door the police detected the odour of marijuana and arrested him. The 
premises were then secured and a search waiTant was obtained. The warrant 
obtained on the basis of the "knock and sniff' was challenged by the appel-
lant under s. 8 of the Charter. 
In Evans a majority of the Supreme Comt recognized that at common law 
there is an implied licence for all members of the public, including police, 
to approach the door of a residence and knock. The Court also recognized, 
however, that the implied invitation extends no further than is required to 
permit convenient communication with the occupant of the home, and only 
those activities that are reasonably associated with this purpose are author-
ized by the implied licence. A police officer who approaches a dwelling for 
the purpose of securing evidence against the occupant exceeds the implied 
invitation and conducts a "search" of the home which must comport with s. 
8 standards. 24 
?') 
--Duarte, supra note 12, at 14. 
23104 C.C.C. (3d) 23, 45 C.R. (4th) 210, 191 N.R. 327, 131 D.L.R. (4th) 654, 33 C.R.R. 
(2d) 248, 69 B.C.A.C. 81, 113 W.A.C. 81, [1996] I S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) at 29 (C.C.C.). 
24/bid. at 33. But contrast this position with State v. Petty, 740 P.2d 879 (Wash. App. 1987), 
where the court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy was intruded upon when po-
lice approached a residence, knocked on the door and sniffed for the odour of marijuana 
when the resident opened. 
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In Evans, once again, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the American 
risk analysis, albeit implicitly. The fact that a member of the public, pursu-
ant to the implied licence to approach and knock, might attend upon a resi-
dence and smell marijuana when the door is opened, was considered of no 
moment. No doubt Canadians accept such a risk as part of the normal inter-
course of daily life. There is a marked difference, however, between that 
risk and the prospect of a police officer approaching a home to secure evi-
dence of criminality against an occupant, in the absence of probable cause 
or a warrant. This same distinction is even more compelling in the context 
of "open fields". 
Although an occupier of a dwelling is deemed to grant the public permis-
sion to approach the door and knock, that licence clearly does not extend 
any further than the approach to a home. For instance, it would not include 
an invitation to enter onto vacant lands adjacent to a home, such as a backy-
ard. In fact, pursuant to provincial statutes and at common law, any such 
entry onto private property would constitute an unlawful trespass. The risk 
that members of the public might disregard the law and enter onto private 
property should be of no significance. No matter how frequently this might 
occur, the fact of the matter is that such conduct remains unlawful. 
The need for consistency would seem to dictate that if the issue ever 
presents itself, the Supreme Court should be compelled to reject the "open 
fields" doctrine, given that it finds its genesis in the "risk analysis". A con-
trary holding would be difficult to reconcile with Evans and the Supreme 
Court's earlier decisions that dealt with unauthorized perimeter searches. In 
the context of "perimeter" searches, the Supreme Court has consistently 
characterized any entry upon prope1iy surrounding a residence to be a 
"search" meriting s. 8 Charter scrutiny, drawing no distinction between the 
"cmtilage" of a home and "open fields".25 
25see R. v. Kokesch. 61 C.C.C. (3dl 207. [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 3.119911 I W.W.R. 193. 121 N.R. 
161. 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 157, I C.R. (4th) 62. 50 C.R.R. 285 (S.C.C.l: R. l'. Plan!. 84 C.C.C. 
(3d) 203. 1199318 W.W.R. 287. 145 A.R. 104. 55 W.A.C. 104, 17 C.R.R. (2d) 297. 12 Alta. 
L.R. (3d) 305, 11993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 24 C.R. (4th) 47, 157 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wiley. 84 
C.C.C. (3d) 161. 24 C.R. (4th) 34. 17 C.R.R. (2d) 314. 158 N.R. 321. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263, 
34 B.C.A.C. 135. 56 W.A.C. 135 (S.C.C. ). Also see J. Atrcns. "'A Comparison Of Canadian 
And American Constitutional Law Relating To Search And Seizure" (1994). I Sw. J.L & 
Trade Arn. 29 at 36. 
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The Reasoning in Patriquen 
Given the above, one is left to wonder why a majority of the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal would choose to endorse the "open fields" doctrine under 
s. 8 of the Charter. Patriquen involved the police entering onto "a secluded 
plot of land surrounded by woods in a rural area". The land was privately 
owned and legally occupied by the appellants. In concluding that the appel-
lants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the land that was 
searched, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal placed a great deal of reliance 
on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boersma.26 
On closer analysis, the decision in Boersma was only superficially analo-
gous. There the police searched an "open field" which consisted of a parcel 
of Crown land which the Supreme Court was careful to point out "was ac-
cessible to everyone." The marijuana which was being cultivated on public 
lands could be seen from an adjacent roadway. Under these circumstances, 
it is quite understandable that the Supreme Court would conclude that the 
appellants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. In 
Patriquen, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal relied upon Boersma to con-
clude that: 
... the expectation of privacy on privately held woodland is not substantially dif-
ferent from that of Crown land .... woodlands in rural areas are in some respects 
"subject to inspection by members of the public at large". See for example the 
provisions of the Angling Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 14 which allow any resident to 
cross on foot any uncultivated land in order to access a lake. stream or river for 
the purpose of fishing.27 
The judgment in Patriquen does not suggest that there was any waterway in 
proximity to the parcel of land that was searched. Instead, the court appea:s 
to use this possibility to trigger an American style risk analysis. Under this 
analysis the risk that a passer-by might traverse the land is sufficient to viti-
ate the existence of any privacy expectation. Unfortunately, the decision ig-
nores that this approach has been repeatedly disapproved of by the Supreme 
Comt. In fairness to the Nova Scotia Comt of Appeal, however, it is impor-
tant to note that it did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Evans. As indicated, Evans would appear to make the applicability of the 
"open fields" doctrine in Canada extremely unlikely. It is for these reasons 
that the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lauda, reported ante 
p. 320, should be preferred. 
26[1994] 2 S.C.R. 488, 168 N.R. 196, 31 C.R. (4th) 386, 45 B.C.A.C. 3, 72 W.A.C. 3 
(S.C.C.). 
27 Patriquen, supra note 2. at 372. 
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Dangers of the American "Risk Analysis" 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lauda is in keeping 
with the Supreme Court's prior pronouncements repudiating the American 
"risk analysis". In contrast, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's judgment in 
Patriquen is premised on an uncritical acceptance of the American "risk 
analysis". If taken to extremes, the American "risk analysis'' can have dev-
astating consequences for personal privacy. 
The most chilling example that reveals the dangers inherent in the recent 
American approach comes in the context of aerial surveillance. According 
to the United States Supreme Court, low altitude air surveillance of an indi-
vidual's residence from a helicopter or airplane is not a "search" because 
individuals assume the risk of such intrusions by commercial air traffic 
passing overhead.28 This conclusion ignores, however, that in both the 
cases that gave rise to these exceptions, the police made their observations 
from altitudes substantially lower than that at which commercial air traffic 
travels. In the one case, for instance, the police made their observations 
from an airplane at 1,000 feet. In the other case, the observations were made 
from a helicopter hovering above a greenhouse below, at an altitude of 400 
feet. 
In concluding that observations from the air did not encroach upon constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests, the United States Supreme Court em-
ployed a "risk analysis". This analysis completely ignores the cost of such 
air surveillance to innocent individuals. It is difficult to envision anything 
more Orwellian than the prospect of state officials making observations of 
our residences from helicopters hovering at low altitudes above our 
homes!29 
28sec California v. Ciraolo (1986), 476 U.S. 207. 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed. 2d 210. 54 
U.S.L.W. 4471 (U.S. Cal.); Florida v. Riley (1989), 488 U.S. 445, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed. 
2d 835, 57 U.S.L.W. 4126 (U.S. Fla.). 
291n Lauda, in a footnote to the judgment. the Court of Appeal for Ontario indicated that 
"For the purposes of this appeal. it is unnecessary to explore the constitutional limits of 
aerial surveillance." See Lauda, supra. footnote 5. The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
has already dealt with this issue, concluding that such surveillance docs not intrude upon 
reasonable expectations of privacy under s. 8, see: R. \'. Hutchings (I 996). 111 C.C.C. (3d) 
215. 83 B.C.A.C. 25. 136 W.A.C. 25. 39 C.R.R. (2d) 309 (B.C. C.A.). In contrast. the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal recently held that aerial surveillance of an individual's garden, 
situated behind their home. from a height of 30 metres, intruded upon a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, see R. v. Kelly ( 1999). 132 C.C.C. (3d) 122. 169 D.L.R. (4th) 720, 22 C.R. 
(5th) 248 (N.B. C.A.). Also see R. v. Cook (May 4, 1999). Doc. St. Paul 9814-0048-C6. 
Edmonton 9903- 0904-CI (Alta. Q.B.), following Hutchings for aerial surveillance from 
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In rejecting the "risk analysis", in favour of a more normative approach to 
the definition of reasonable privacy expectations, the Supreme Court of 
Canada was undoubtedly aware of the dangers inherent in the American 
approach. In this regard, the Supreme Court paid close attention to the 
warnings of leading American Fom1h Amendment scholars, such as Profes-
sor Anthony G. Amsterdam. Amsterdam cautioned against using a risk as-
sumption approach because, given advancements in law enforcement tech-
niques, there is a danger that the individual will be forced to withdraw from 
society, "retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, 
turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet"30 in order to ward of 
the spectre of state intrusion. This eventuality has been deemed unaccept-
able by the Supreme Court of Canada which has insisted that "[s]ection 8 of 
the Charter exists to protect privacy and not solitude".3 1 
Conclusion 
The "open fields" doctrine is one of many examples of the American "risk 
analysis" at work. This risk reasoning is dangerous. It is capable of being 
taken to unfathomable extremes. As the aerial surveillance cases demon-
strate, it is easy to envision risks to individual privacy that can be employed 
as a rationale for doing away with the constitutional safeguard entirely. 
It is for this reason that the American "risk analysis", and the blanket ex-
ceptions to the Fourth Amendment which it has spawned, like the "open 
fields" doctrine, should find no sanctuary in Canadian jurisprudence. 
Canadians deserve more. They deserve meaningful protections from state 
intrusions on their privacy. Protections that are not fleeting. Protections that 
are not extinguished the moment the state is able to conjure up some theo-
retical risk to their personal privacy. 
1.000 feet but Kelly for aerial surveillance from 50 feet! The Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed the constitutional status of this form of surveillance in Canada. 
30A. G. Amsterdam. "Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment" (1974), 58 Minnesota L. 
Rev. 349 at 402. Cited with approval in Wong, supra note 12, at 477. 
31wise, supra note 12, at 207, LaForest J., dissenting in the result only. 
